Pigeon Effect
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China Shock 2.0?

Talk of a second “China shock” and of Chinese “overcapacity” has grown loud. Nine strategic world markets since 2000 show where Chinese companies really gained ground, where they climbed steadily and where they are still barely present.

2026-10 · 2000 – 2025

“China shock” began as a term of economics, not of alarm. David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson used it for the surge of Chinese imports that followed the country’s entry into the WTO in 2001, and for the factory jobs it cost in parts of the United States: furniture, toys, textiles, the assembly of electronics. Two decades later the term has a sequel. “China Shock 2.0” is now applied to electric cars, batteries, solar panels and chips, and it usually arrives with a second word, “overcapacity”: the charge that Chinese industry, with help from the state, produces far more than its home market can absorb and sells the rest abroad at prices rivals cannot match. In 2024 both Washington and Brussels raised duties on Chinese electric cars, the one citing unfair trade practices, the other subsidies. Both terms bundle a description with an argument, and both are easier to repeat than to measure. This project attempts the measuring.

Research Questions

  • How much of the combined revenue of nine strategic markets do Chinese companies earn, and is that share rising faster than before?
  • In which markets did China’s share change gear, in which did it climb steadily, and where is Chinese competition still marginal?
  • If the rise is mostly old, why does it feel like a shock now?

Nine markets, measured in revenue

The project follows nine world markets from 2000 to 2025: automobiles, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, semiconductors, mobile phones, batteries, wind energy, solar energy and robotics. Each is measured by the revenue of the companies that sell into it, converted to US dollars, and together they came to US$6.2 trillion in 2025. They differ enormously in size and momentum. Cars alone account for US$2.9 trillion, almost half of the total; robotics for US$36 billion. Over the past ten years the battery market grew almost tenfold, and chips, solar, wind and robotics roughly tripled, while cars, aerospace, medicines and phones grew by a third to three fifths. A share of a fast-growing market and a share of a mature one mean different things, and the analysis below keeps them apart.

A loose map of Made in China 2025

Most of the nine correspond to sectors named in Made in China 2025, the industrial strategy Beijing announced in 2015: next-generation information technology (chips, and less directly phones), robotics, aerospace equipment, new-energy vehicles (batteries, and part of the car market), power equipment (wind and, at a stretch, solar) and biomedicine. The match is loose. The plan names industries in the language of policy; companies report revenue in the language of their own business, and the two rarely line up. A carmaker’s accounts do not separate the electric cars the plan targets from the petrol cars it does not, and phones and solar panels were mass markets in which Chinese firms competed long before the plan was written. Each market is therefore taken whole and shared out by the home of the companies that sell into it: the country of the majority owner or, where no one holds a majority, of the headquarters.

Explore the data yourself

Nine markets, 2000 to 2025, every company figure with its source and grade. The tool opens full-screen, on its own page.

Look into the numbers

One fifth of US$6.2 trillion

Add the nine markets together and Chinese companies earned US$1.2 trillion of US$6.2 trillion in 2025, or 19.4%. That is a share of the summed dollars, not an average of nine percentages, which would let robotics weigh as much as cars. In 2000 the figure was 1.2%. It passed 10% in 2013 and gained about a point a year until 2020, when it reached 17.8%. Since then it has added 1.6 points in five years: no five-year span since 2000 has seen a smaller gain. Nor is the slowdown a matter of weighting: held at the market sizes of 2020, the gain would have been smaller still. Cars carry the total. They supply half of China’s US$1.2 trillion and more than half of the US$450 billion Chinese companies added since 2020; batteries, the market most often cited as proof of a new shock, added US$105 billion.

Where the share changed gear

Batteries are the clear case. Chinese makers earned 40% of the revenue in 2020 and 73% in 2025, while the market itself grew from US$47 billion to US$172 billion: CATL, BYD and their domestic rivals grew with the electric car, and their Korean and Japanese competitors grew more slowly. Wind energy moved from 23% to 38% over the same five years, though part of that rise is an artefact of the data: several Chinese turbine and component makers enter the table only in recent years, because their earlier accounts could not be found. Robotics shows a jump of its own, from 6% to 33% in 2016, but that was a single transaction, Midea’s takeover of the German robot maker KUKA, and the share has hovered around a third ever since. Together, batteries and wind are worth US$275 billion, less than a twentieth of the nine markets.

Long climbs, and where they turned

Elsewhere the picture is one of long, mostly steady climbs, some of which have stalled. In cars the Chinese share rose from 1% in 2000 to 22% in 2025, a little under a point a year, and the electric-car boom shows up as a continuation rather than a kink: since 2020 the share has grown by half a point a year, more slowly than the long-run average. Chips have crept up by about a third of a point a year, from almost nothing to 8.7%. Phones saw the steepest climb in the data, and it is a decade old: from 4% in 2011 to 41% in 2020. Then US sanctions cut Huawei off from advanced chips and Google’s services, and the share fell to 29% in 2022; it is 32% today. Solar rose earliest and furthest, past 50% in 2014 and to a peak of 78% in 2022. Since then both the share and the market have shrunk: the price collapse that made panels cheap for everyone hit the Chinese makers hardest, whose solar revenue fell by almost two fifths between 2023 and 2025, while that of the rest fell by a tenth.

Where Chinese firms are still marginal

The three markets in which Chinese companies are least present are among the largest: pharmaceuticals, aerospace and semiconductors, together US$2.4 trillion, two fifths of the total. Chinese firms earn 7.4% of it, slightly less than in 2020. In medicines their share has stayed close to 5% since 2018. In aerospace it is 9.9%, most of it AVIC and the other state groups, counted here by the arms sales SIPRI records for them; it peaked at 13% in 2022 and has eased since, as Chinese revenue held flat while Airbus, Boeing and the Western defence groups grew. In chips Chinese companies earn 8.7% after two decades of state support, and since 2022 US export controls have been designed to keep the most advanced production out of their reach. These are the markets where products are hardest to make, and in medicines and aircraft slowest to approve; by revenue, no shock has arrived here.

What the numbers settle, and what they do not

Counted this way, there is no single China shock but three different stories: a sharp gain in batteries and, less certainly, in wind; long climbs that have slowed or reversed in cars, phones and solar; and three large markets in which Chinese firms remain marginal. Two limits apply. The tool counts what companies sell, wherever they make it, not what countries export, so it cannot settle the overcapacity argument, which concerns production, prices and trade balances. And a share of revenue says nothing about profits, subsidies or jobs. What it can rule out is a sudden, general break: the combined share has risen more slowly in the past five years than in any five-year span since 2000. Why, then, does it feel like a shock now? The next three sections are guesses, and offered as such.

Guess one: the factory finally got a face

Chinese companies were key players in many industries long before 2020; you just could not see them. Manufacturing is invisible at the shop: nobody knows who made the phone, the trainers or the solar panel on the neighbour’s roof, because the label says Apple, Nike or the local utility. What has changed is the label. Labubu, Elf Bar, Black Myth: Wukong, DJI, Lenovo and many more now land in the hands of Western customers who picked them by name. Next to the long-established trade imbalances, most of them are economically tiny. But we think about them every day, we see them on the bus and on our friends’ handbags, and what is on our minds feels big. A trade deficit is a statistic. A Labubu on a handbag is a Tuesday.

Guess two: a story with a policy attached

“Overcapacity” sounds like a description. I suspect it is closer to a preview: the word that comes before the measures to shrink China’s export surplus. Remember where we started. Germany spent decades proudly calling itself Exportweltmeister, export world champion, and discussed quite openly how industrial policy could help it export even more. Not everyone in Athens, Rome or Madrid found the title as charming as Berlin did. China was the dream customer: it needed machines to fill its factories, and its new middle class was hungry for cars, luxury goods, medicines, aircraft and everything else with a Western label. Exporting was a virtue as long as we were the ones doing it. Now that China has worked out cars, batteries and solar panels and wants to sell them abroad, the story needs a rewrite: suddenly its exports can only be the product of subsidies and violations of WTO rules. Subsidies are real, in Beijing as in Washington and Brussels. But a story that explains every Chinese success by cheating and every German one by quality is not an analysis. It is a position.

Guess three: a comfortable old picture

“Made in China” used to mean poor quality. That association was more comfortable than true, and I suspect some of it still sits in our heads. In 2014 Joe Biden challenged his listeners: “Name me one innovative project, one innovative change, one innovative product that has come out of China.” Today many people are shocked, and the numbers above say it is not because anything changed overnight. We are shocked because we kept a dismissive picture alive of who is able to innovate: a picture with little room for countries outside the Pax Americana and the Washington Consensus. The surprise says more about the picture than about the country.

Counting by the company’s home

A car built in Shanghai by a Volkswagen joint venture counts here as German, and an iPhone assembled in Zhengzhou as American: every market is shared out by the home of the companies that sell it, not by where the factories stand. A company’s home is the country of whoever owns more than half of it, and where no one does, of its headquarters: Volvo Cars counts as Chinese since Geely Holding bought it in 2010, KUKA since Midea took it over in 2016, and Chugai as Swiss since Roche took the majority in 2002. Countries groups the companies by their home country; Companies shows the firms themselves, grouped the same way. China is always the orange band at the foot of the chart, so its growth reads against the baseline; the other homes and companies are told apart by their labels, not by colour.

Sources and gaps

Every figure is a company’s reported revenue from the market in question, taken from its annual report or filings wherever possible; China’s state aerospace groups are counted by their arms sales as recorded by SIPRI. Figures are converted to US dollars at the average of the Federal Reserve’s monthly exchange rates over the company’s fiscal year. The aim is to count every company with more than US$100 million in revenue. Where a figure was not published it is estimated, and every value carries its grade: reported, derived from reported figures, or estimated. Coverage remains uneven, above all in the early years and in wind, batteries and phones, where firms whose accounts could not be found are missing. A share is therefore a share of the companies counted, not of an official world total. Every number, with its document and its grade, is in the tool’s Sources panel.

Reading the tool

The overview sets the nine markets side by side, largest first, each with China’s share year by year on the same 0 to 100% scale. Open one for the full picture: it starts on the whole market in US dollars, one switch turns the stack into shares and another swaps countries for companies. Point at or tap a year to see who held what, and select a band to read its source. The lane above the chart marks mergers, takeovers and spin-offs. Every view can be shared as a link.